Karl Dewey, CBRN analyst, Jane’s by IHS Markit
Although North Korean calls for denuclearisation have sparked hope of resolving its nuclear programme, such calls are not new. Pyongyang views itself as a fully-fledged nuclear state and has traditionally seen calls to denuclearise in the context of global denuclearisation – a point that was continued through Kim’s references to “worldwide disarmament” and the “total halt of nuclear tests.”
It is likely that key conceptual differences will remain in interpreting the term “denuclearisation” between North Korea and the US. For example, last year China and the US agreed that efforts to denuclearise the Korean Peninsula should be “complete, verifiable and irreversible.” Such an outcome is only possible through a complete declaration of North Korea’s nuclear infrastructure by Pyongyang and the permitting of intrusive inspections to verify that sites have indeed been dismantled or converted to alternative uses. Where there is doubt that North Korea’s declaration is inaccurate or incomplete, the international community will require a mechanism to investigate and gain confidence that North Korea’s has not simply established parallel facilities in which to continue its nuclear activities.
North Korea’s several recent conciliatory gestures to support its stated desire to disarm include the discontinuation of nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests. It is important to note, however, that such language allows North Korea to resume such tests as required, and does not commit North Korea to cease the development work on such weapons behind the scenes.
Similarly, although Pyongyang has stated it will dismantle the Punggye-ri nuclear test site, the site itself is suspected of having structural issues and this may simply be a prudent decision from safety perspective. Furthermore, Punggye-ri’s closure does not preclude the possibilities that North Korean engineers are satisfied with the design of their nuclear devices (and thus no longer need to test); that a second facility could be established or the North could escalate to an atmospheric test still. In this sense, North Korea’s interpretation of denuclearisation is likely to revolve around decreasing the saliency of nuclear and missile tests in its diplomacy, rather than the complete, verifiable and irreversible disarmament desired by the West.
Indeed, resolutions passed following Kim’s address to the Third Plenary Meeting of the Seventh Central Committee of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) still emphasised the role of nuclear weapons in guaranteeing North Korea’s security, stating that “The DPRK will never use nuclear weapons … under any circumstances unless there are nuclear threat and nuclear provocation against the DPRK.” While this marks a small clarification to the North Korea’s April 2013 law on Consolidating the position of nuclear weapons state for self-defence, it hints at the permanence of North Korea’s perceptions.
Talks will have to address all of these issues, yet remain mindful of the fact North Korea is a sovereign state that desires to be regarded as an equal power. In denuclearising the Korean peninsula, North Korea will likely expect reciprocal gestures, which may prompt further debate between the US and its regional allies over what level of forces are necessary to guarantee their security but also signal willingness to engage with Pyongyang.
Alison Evans, Deputy Head Asia Pacific Country Risk, IHS Markit
Upcoming inter-Korean summit mitigates risk of conflict in the Korean peninsula
North Korean official media announced on 20 April that the country would “discontinue” nuclear testing and launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Separately, on 20 April, North Korea and South Korea tested a new leader-to-leader direct “hotline” involving North Korea’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un and South Korean President Moon Jae-in.
North Korea has offered similar testing suspensions, most recently in 2015 in an offer to South Korea of a leadership summit, which was turned down. The new announcement may well reflect Kim’s judgment that North Korea has made sufficient progress towards achieving a nuclear deterrent to suspend testing – he claimed as much in his New Year’s Day speech. North Korean weapons testing and the absence of direct channels of communication have been key contributors to the risk of interstate war on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, these changes are risk-positive, probably mitigating the risk of escalation towards conflict – as long as it remains in use. (For example, in the past, North Korea has simply not picked up calls from South Korea during periods of poor relations.)
However, it is almost certain that North Korea is, and will remain, unwilling to “denuclearise” as defined by the United States and its allies. North Korea’s statement mentioned “global disarmament,” and prior to inter-Korean summits in 2000 and 2007, North Korea had similarly mentioned the removal of what it called the US’s “hostile policy” as a pre-condition for North Korean concessions.
Indicators that point to a perpetuation of the currently reduced risk of interstate war include North Korea and South Korea issuing a joint statement after the 27 April Kim-Moon summit that commits them to continuing diplomatic engagement, as well as a subsequent agreement on the date for the planned summit between Kim and US President Donald Trump. Ultimately, however, if the North Korea-US summit fails to conclude in an agreement, war risks will increase, exceeding previous levels, because of another failure of diplomacy.
